We analyze the optimal execution problem of a portfolio manager trading multiple assets. In addition to the liquidity and risk of each individual asset, we consider cross-asset interactions in these two dimensions, which substantially changes the nature of the problem. Focusing on the market microstructure, we build a tractable order book model to capture the supply/demand dynamics in a multi-asset setting, which allows us to formulate and solve the portfolio execution problem. We find that cross-asset risk and liquidity considerations are of critical importance in constructing the optimal execution policies. We show that even when our goal is to trade a single asset, its optimal execution may involve transitory trades in other assets. In general, optimally managing the risk of the portfolio during the execution process affects the synchronization of trading in different assets. Moreover, correlations in the liquidity across assets lead to complex patterns in the optimal execution policies. In particular, we highlight cases where aggregate costs can be reduced by temporarily overshooting one's target portfolio.
Introduction
This paper formulates and solves the optimal execution problem of a portfolio manager trading multiple correlated assets in the face of cross-market impact. The execution process exhibits two main difficulties: First, the available "at-the-money" liquidity is finite and scarce, prompting managers to split larger orders into smaller ones and execute them over time. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the act of trading can influence current and future liquidity dynamics. For example, a large buy order is empirically known to move prices higher, which implies that subsequent purchases involve higher costs. Similarly, a sell order can push prices lower, implying that subsequent sales generate less revenue. This feedback mechanism is known as "price impact" and its consequence on real investment returns can be substantial. For example, Perold (1988) , shows that execution costs can often erase true returns, leading to a significant "implementation shortfall". * Tsoukalas (gtsouk@wharton.upenn.edu) is from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Wang (wangj@mit.edu) is from MIT Sloan School of Management, CCFR and NBER. Giesecke (giesecke@stanford.edu) is from Stanford University, MS&E. We are grateful to seminar participants from the 2011 Annual INFORMS Meeting in Charlotte, the Management Science seminar at Rutgers University, the Operations Management seminar at the Wharton school, University of Pennsylvania and the 2012 Annual MSOM Meeting at Columbia University, for useful comments. Tsoukalas and Giesecke are very grateful to Jeff Blokker and the Mericos Foundation for a grant that supported this work.
Controlling price impact is a challenging problem because it requires modeling how markets will react to one's discrete actions. In practice, this requires a significant investment in information technology and human capital, which can be prohibitive. Therefore, many firms choose to outsource their execution needs or use black-box algorithms from specialized third parties, such as banks with sophisticated electronic trading desks. Moreover, this execution services industry has been growing rapidly over the past decade. Unsurprisingly, there is a vast literature studying optimal execution. Most of the existing work focuses on a specific type of execution objective, namely, the problem of optimal liquidation for a single risky asset. One strand of the literature seeks to develop functional forms of price impact, grounded in empirical observations. 1 The other focuses on the market microstructure foundations of price-impact in limit order markets. Recently, pro-technology regulations have continued to fuel the wide-spread adoption of electronic communication networks driven by limit order books.
The order books aggregate and publish the inventory of available orders submitted by all market participants. In other words, they display the instantaneous supply/demand of liquidity available in the market. Consequently, many recent papers focus on this feature. In particular, Alfonsi et al. (2008) , Alfonsi et al. (2010) , Bayraktar & Ludkovski (2011) , Cont, Stoikov & Talreja (2010) , Obizhaeva & Wang (2012) , Maglaras & Moallemi (2011) and Predoiu, Shaikhet & Shreve (2011) , propose market microstructure models in which price impact can be understood as a consequence of fluctuations in the supply and demand of liquidity. 2 One advantage of this approach is that the optimal strategies obtained are robust to different order book profiles. This second strand of the literature highlights the fact that supply/demand considerations are crucial.
We develop a tractable model of the limit order book, allowing us to address a general class of multi-objective/multi-asset execution problems. The key question we seek to address is how managers can maximize their expected wealth from execution (or more generally, their expected utility) when trading portfolios composed of dynamically interacting assets. As much interest as the single-asset case has generated, the multivariate problem has been less studied, perhaps because "the portfolio setting clearly is considerably more complex than the single-stock case" (Bertsimas, Hummel & Lo (1999) , page 2). Our motivation is based on the following observation: Executing one asset can affect the prices of other assets in the same portfolio, and this can have a profound effect on its overall value. More specifically, asset cross-elasticities can work in constructive or destructive ways. What exacerbates the problem further is that the interactions are not limited to the correlations between the stochastic processes describing market prices. Indeed, we observe that executing an order in one asset has a "cross-impact" on other assets, potentially affecting the evolution of their entire supply/demand curves. 3 1 For example, see Almgren & Chriss (2000) , Almgren (2009) , Lorenz & Almgren (2012) , Bertsimas & Lo (1998) , He & Mamaysky (2005) , Schied & Schoeneborn (2009) . For empirical foundations, see Bouchaud, Farmer & Lillo (2009) for a survey, as well as references in Alfonsi, Schied & Schulz (2008) , Alfonsi, Schied & Fruth (2010) and Obizhaeva & Wang (2012) . For details regarding empirical limit order book behavior, see Biais, Hillion & Spatt (1995) and Weber & Rosenow (2005) . For studies on how trade size affects prices see Chan & Fong (2000) , Chan & Lakonishok (1995) , Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam (2002) and Dufour & Engle (2000) .
2 In other related work, Rosu (2009) develops a full equilibrium game theoretic framework and characterizes several important empirically verifiable results based on a model of a limit order market for one asset. Moallemi, Park & Van Roy (2012) develop an insightful equilibrium model of a trader facing an uninformed arbitrageur and show that optimal execution strategies can differ significantly when strategic agents are present in the market.
3 The existence of cross-impact effects has been empirically documented and theoretically justified. King & Wadhwani To tackle the problem, we develop a multivariate order book model with coupled supply/demand dynamics. Here, an order executed in one direction (buy or sell) will affect both the currently available inventory of limit orders and also future incoming orders on either side. The intuition is simple: Any market participant can update his beliefs based on observed order flow, irrespective of his own intent and position. Therefore, there is a priori no reason to rule out the possibility that double-sided (buy and sell) strategies may be optimal even if the original objective is unidirectional (e.g. in the standard liquidation problem). However, allowing for arbitrary dynamics leads to some serious modeling difficulties. In particular, there is no reason to assume that the supply and demand sides of the order books are symmetric, implying that the manager's buy and sell orders need to be treated separately.
To this end, we need to introduce inequality constraints on the control variables, which renders the optimization computationally challenging -the usual dynamic programming (DP) framework breaks down as the number of decision points increases. To solve the problem, we first show that in our setting the optimal policy is path independent. This allows us to find an equivalent static formulation of the original DP under some mild restrictions on the price processes (namely, the absence of serial correlation). We then provide conditions allowing us to restate the problem as a convex quadratic program (QP). The QP approach efficiently handles inequality constraints and time-dependent parameters, and guarantees global optimums in polynomial time.
Our model implies that managers can utilize cross-asset interactions to significantly reduce riskadjusted execution costs. The associated optimal policies involve advanced strategies, such as conducting a series of buy and sell trades, in multiple assets, over time. In other words, we find that managers can benefit by over-trading during the execution phase. This result can a priori seem counter-intuitive.
Indeed, we demonstrate that one can lower risk-adjusted trading costs, by trading more. We show that this is the case because a unique trade-off arises in the multivariate setting. While sourcing greater liquidity generally leads to higher charges, one can also take advantage of asset correlation and cross-impact to reduce risk via offsetting trades. Similar to the Merton (1971) framework, we capture this trade-off through an exponential utility function, parametrized by a risk-aversion coefficient.
Furthermore, we also show that in some cases (such as when certain asymmetries exist between the cross-impact parameters), aggregate execution costs can be reduced in the risk-neutral case.
Another interesting feature is that multivariate strategies turn out to be optimal for simple unidirectional execution objectives. Even in the trivial case where the objective is to either buy or sell units in a single asset, we find that the manager can benefit by simultaneously trading back and forth in other correlated securities. Previous work has focused on modeling the available buy-side or sell-side (1990) argue that in the presence of information asymmetry among investors, correlated information shocks can lead to cross-asset liquidity effects among fundamentally related assets. Fleming, Kirby & Ostdiek (1998) show that portfolio rebalancing trades from privately informed investors can lead to cross-impact in the presence of risk aversion, even between assets that are fundamentally uncorrelated. Another possible source of cross-impact relates to the trading activity of speculators. In particular, Kyle & Xiong (2001) and Yuan (2005) , show that correlated liquidity shocks due to financial constraints can lead to cross-liquidity effects. Pasquariello & Vega (2012) develop a stylized model and provide empirical evidence suggesting that cross-impact may stem from the strategic trading activity of sophisticated speculators who are trying to mask their informational advantage. Beyond informational trading, cross-impact can also result from dealers' attempts to manage their inventory fluctuations, see Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam (2000) , Chordia & Subrahmanyam (2004) and Andrade, Chang & Seasholes (2008) . Lastly, evidence of comovement stemming from sentiment-based views has been studied in Barberis, Shleifer & Wurgler (2005) .
liquidity independently of each other. Our results suggest that these cannot generally be decoupled when accounting for cross-asset interactions. Furthermore, the associated strategies are often nontrivial. For instance, we show that when constructing a portfolio, one can reduce execution risk by establishing long positions in positively correlated assets. Our model explains why this type of trade provides an effective hedge against subsequent price volatility.
Extending the analysis to portfolios with heterogeneous liquidity across assets (e.g. small-cap vs.
large-cap stocks), we find that within the same portfolio, liquid vs. illiquid assets have drastically different optimal policies. In particular, illiquid assets lead to trivial policies (such as executing half the position at the start and the rest at the end of the horizon). On the other hand, liquid assets may involve complex optimal strategies, such as temporarily overshooting one's targeted position during the execution window. This simple insight leads to the following realization: The different trading rates associated with each type of asset could leave managers over-exposed to transient synchronization risk, even if the final portfolio is well-diversified. In particular, we highlight cases where managers could be overly long the illiquid asset at certain times during the execution phase. This can be of great concern in times of crisis where liquidity can dry up quickly. We address this concern by introducing diversification constraints on the asset weights at each period. However, these additional constraints come at the expense of higher execution costs. This leads to an interesting diversification/efficiency trade-off that we explicitly characterize as the additional cost one would have to incur (over the most efficient case) in order to maintain a desired diversification profile throughout the execution horizonor "cost of diversification" for short. We provide a practical method that managers can utilize to trade off diversification risk for execution efficiency, based on their preferences.
Our analysis has implications for other important problems in portfolio management. The QP formulation can easily be integrated into existing portfolio optimization problems that treat transaction costs as a central theme. For example, the asset allocation problem with transaction costs is one of the most central problems in portfolio management. 4 Our model provides an understanding of the origin of these costs and of their propagation dynamics in the portfolio setting. The insights we develop can thus allow portfolio managers to better assess the applicability of some common cost assumptions in this strand of literature (such as cost convexity, no overshooting and diagonal impact matrices). 5
There is some prior work on the multivariate liquidation problem. Bertsimas et al. (1999) develop an approximation algorithm for a risk-neutral agent, which solves the multivariate portfolio problem while efficiently handling inequality constraints. Almgren & Chriss (2000) briefly discuss the portfolio problem with a mean-variance objective in their appendix and obtain a solution for the simplified case without cross-impact. Engle & Ferstenberg (2007) solve a joint composition and execution mean-variance problem with no cross-impact using the model from Almgren & Chriss (2000) . They find that cross-asset trading can become optimal even without cross-impact effects. Brown, Carlin & Lobo (2010) treat a multivariate 2-period liquidation problem with distress risk, focusing on the 4 See Brown & Smith (2011) and references therein for recent advances. 5 A more concrete example of how cost models can be integrated in a broader framework can be found in Iancu & Trichakis (2012) , which focuses on the multi-account portfolio optimization problem. A discussion regarding the applicability of advanced cross-asset strategies and how they relate to agency trading and best execution constraints can also be found in the same paper.
trade-offs between liquid and illiquid assets. In contrast to these papers, we analyze the more general multi-objective execution problem focusing on the market microstructure origins of price impact. This allows us to characterize the optimal policies as a function of intuitive order book parameters, such as inventory levels, replenishment rates and bid-ask transaction costs. These parameters could be calibrated to tick by tick high-frequency data. 6
The Liquidity Model
We adopt the following notation convention: vectors are in lower case bold, matrices in upper-case bold, and scalars in standard font. The proofs of results are given in the appendix.
Model Summary
The model specifies how each asset's price process responds to the manager's trades and to the price process of other assets. Section 2.2 describes the set of admissible trading strategies we consider. We will assume each buy or sell order submitted to the exchange will be executed against the available inventory in the limit order books. We then specify a response mechanism by which new orders arrive to refill the order books, i.e., the order book replenishment process. In Section 2.3, we explain how the instantaneous distribution of orders in the order book affects the temporary price impact component, while the permanent impact component is related to how other traders update their beliefs about the assets' fundamental values. Section 2.4 describes the replenishment process in detail: Following each executed trade, new incoming orders arrive, reverting prices and collapsing the bid-ask spread towards a steady state, which we define. This liquidity mean-reversion property provides an incentive for the manager to split his original order over time. By so-doing, he can take advantage of more favorable limit orders arriving at future periods. However, delaying trading also introduces more price uncertainty. We formulate and solve this essential trade-off between liquidity and risk.
Set of Admissible Strategies
We consider an investment space of M assets indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , M } = I M . There are N + 1 equally spaced trading times, indexed by n ∈ {0, . . . , N } = I N , with period length τ = 1/N . Let D = (N + 1) × M be the dimension of the problem. Irrespective of the manager's objective, we assume he has the option of purchasing or selling/shorting units in any of the assets during any of the discrete times, as long as he satisfies his boundary conditions at the horizon N . Let x + i,n ≥ 0 and x − i,n ≥ 0 be his order sizes for buy and sell orders respectively, in asset i at time n. These will constitute the control variables over the trading horizon. We also define the following corresponding buy and sell 6 Disentangling cross-impact from correlation for individual securities is a challenging statistical problem which is beyond the scope of this paper. Empirical estimation of cross-impact is an active area of research for high-frequency trading firms and could also be an interesting direction for future academic research.
vectors stacking orders by asset and/or trading times: 7 asset i:
. . .
Next, we define the execution objective by formulating the boundary conditions. Let z i;n represent the net amount of shares left to be purchased (or sold, if negative) in asset i at time n, before the incoming order at time n. Following the vector conventions defined above, we have by definition:
where ∆ M is a simple matrix operator with parameter M and dimension (2M × M ), such that
These specific variable and notation choices for z and ∆ will be convenient in the formulation of the dynamic program which we detail in later sections. The boundary conditions which must hold ∀i are
, where 1 N = 1 . . . 1 is a 1 × (N + 1) vector of ones. Using these notations, the global boundary condition of the portfolio can be expressed as
with 1 = diag(1 N , . . . , 1 N ). We illustrate with an example: Consider a fund turning over a portfolio with initial positions {100, 0} units in assets 1 and 2, and desired exposures {50, 50} units by time N .
It would be required to purchase z 1,0 = −50 units in asset 1 (i.e. sell 50 units) and z 2,0 = 50 units in asset 2 by time N . Therefore z ;0 = [−50; 50] in this case.
Definition 1 (Admissible Execution Strategies) The list of all possible execution paths that can be chosen by the manager in (N + 1) trading times and M assets, constitutes the set S of admissible execution policies/strategies. The set is fully characterized by the original execution constraints z ;0 ∈ R M :
The set of strategies in Definition 1 is broad in the sense that no restrictions (such as shorting or budget constraints) are imposed during the trading window, as long as the boundary constraints are satisfied by time N .
Having established the preliminary notations, the next step is to model the manager's market impact. In other words, we need to describe how his actions affect the prices of assets in his own portfolio. In a partial-equilibrium framework, this is equivalent to modeling how agents in the market 7 These will be useful in formulating the optimization problem later on. We will be adopting this vector notation convention for each variable subsequently introduced, unless otherwise specified.
respond to the manager's orders. The next section is therefore dedicated to developing an adequate liquidity model, which will then allow us to formulate the manager's dynamic optimization problem.
Order Book Model
The basic building blocks of limit order markets consist of three order types: Limit orders are placed by market participants who commit their intent to buy (bids) or sell (asks) a certain volume at a specified worst-case (or limit) price. In essence, they represent the current visible and available inventory of orders in the market. Market orders are immediate orders placed by market participants who want to buy or sell a specific size at the current best prices available in the market. They are executed against existing supply or demand in the limit order book. Cancellation orders remove unfilled orders from the order book. To preserve tractability, we follow the existing literature in assuming that the manager is a liquidity taker, i.e., he submits market orders that are executed against available inventory in the book on a single exchange. 8 Although prices and quantities are discrete, we adopt a continuous model of the order book which is entirely described by its density functions: q a (p) for the ask side and q b (p) for the bid side. The density functions map available units (q) to limit order prices (p) and thus describe the distribution of available inventory in the order book over all price levels, at any given point in time. To illustrate, Figure 1 displays a partial snap-shot of (a) the oil futures limit order book as of November 8, 2011 at 11:10am and as a comparison, an equivalent continuous-model (b) and a simplified continuous model (c). The continuous model along with a simplifying assumption on the order book density functions (see Assumption 1) will allow us to keep the problem tractable and focused on the multivariate aspect of the model. We refer to Alfonsi et al. (2010) for a discussion about general types of density functions and to Predoiu et al. (2011) for an equivalence between discrete and continuous models. A queuing-based approach can be found in Cont et al. (2010) . Assumption 1 (Order Book Shapes) All assets in the portfolio have block-shaped order books with infinite depth 9 and time-invariant steady-state densities. Letting q a i , q b i be constants, and denoting by a i,n , b i,n the best available bid/ask prices in each order book at time n, we have
Figure 1(c) provides an illustration of this assumption. The bid and ask order books are referenced around the asset mid-prices. Let m i,n be the mid-price of asset i at time n. Independently of the manager's orders, we assume that the asset mid-prices at each period m ;n , are driven by an exogenous stochastic vector w ;n , which is defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) with filtration (F n ) n∈I N .
Assumption 2 (Stochastic Processes) The stochastic processes w i,n driving the mid-prices are random walks, 10 with zero drift. Let u ;n ∼ N (0, τ Σ u ) be a vector of normal random variables with covariance τ Σ u , such that ∀n ∈ I N , E[u i,n u j,n−1 ] = 0 and E[u i,n u j,n ] = τ σ ij . We have
with E[w i,n |F n−1 ] = w i,n−1 . The stochastic processes are not influenced by the manager's trading activity and can account for exogenous random innovations, such as news arrivals.
Next, we define the steady state of an order book as the shape it takes when the best available bid and ask prices reach an equilibrium bid-ask spread above the stochastic mid-prices m i,n (see Figure   2 (a)). The steady state prices are denoted by a ∞ i,n and b ∞ i,n . Although the equilibrium bid-ask spread is assumed constant, the actual bid-ask spread is in fact volatile, as will become clear in the order book dynamics Section 2.4.
In addition to driving the mid-prices of each asset, the stochastic processes also drive each asset's entire supply/demand curves. This results directly from the definition of the steady state, which is tied to stochastic mid-price at all times. Furthermore, the time-invariance assumption around the density functions and equilibrium spreads is made in order to simplify the exposition and keep our analysis focused on the multivariate aspect of the problem. We provide an example in the Appendix B.2 to show that our framework can accommodate time-dependent order book parameters.
Order Book Dynamics
We extend the single-asset one-sided liquidity model in Obizhaeva & Wang (2012) in two directions.
First, we develop the dynamics of a two-sided order book model with coupled bid and ask sides (i.e., a trade in one direction will affect both sides of the order book) and bid-ask transaction costs. Second, we consider the two-asset case and show that interactions between assets justify the need for a two-sided order book model. Then, an extension to the general multivariate case (M assets) is provided.
Single Asset.
We break down the price impact process into three phases: In phase 1, the manager submits an order which is executed against available inventory, creating a temporary price impact (TPI). In phase 2, agents update their beliefs and displace the asset's mid-price accordingly, creating a permanent price impact (PPI). In the last phase, new limit orders arrive in the books, replenishing the inventory and initiating the recovery process. Next, we describe how each of these phases could be affected in a two-sided model. . . .
. . . Consider a market order arriving at time n to buy 11 x = x + i,n > 0 units in an arbitrary asset i. Figure 2 shows possible dynamics that i can face after getting hit by the order. 12 At time n − 1 we illustrate i in its steady state (see Fig. 2(a) ). At the next period in time n (see Fig. 2(b) ), the incoming order is executed against available inventory on the ask side of i's order book, starting from the best available price and rolling up i's supply curve towards less-favorable prices. This gradually drives i's best ask price from a i,n → a * i,n , where the superscript denotes the moment immediately following an executed order. This results in a TPI displacement: f a i,n (x, q a ) = a i,n (x) * − a i,n . Given a density shape q a (p) the amount of units executed over a small increment in price is simply dx = q a (p)dp . An 11 We focus on a single buy order, implying x − i,n = 0, but the results are directly applicable to sell orders as well. 12 We do not illustrate the impact of the random walk to keep the figures clear.
executed buy order of size x therefore shifts the best ask price according to
Combining the above expression with Assumption 1 we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (Temporary Price Impact) An incoming market order to buy (sell) x + i;n (x − i,n ) shares at time n, will instantaneously displace the ask (bid) price of i according to
The corresponding TPI displacements in the best bid/ask limit order prices are linear in the order size:
The immediate cost the manager incurs in this phase as a result of the TPI, can then simply be calculated by integrating the prevailing price over the total amount of units executed:
x 0 a * i,n (u)du. In the second phase, (see Fig. 2 (c)) we assume that all agents in the market are able to update their beliefs about the asset's fundamental value. Similar to Obizhaeva & Wang (2012) , this processes is assumed to be exogenous and effectively adds a PPI, g i,n (x), to the asset's stochastic mid-price process.
Therefore, at time n + 1, right before a new incoming trade arrives, the mid-price process will be given
. Assuming a simple linear form, 13 an executed buy (sell) order of size x in i creates a linear displacement in i's mid-price given by g i,n (x) = λ
Here, we have made the assumption that only the net order size matters with respect to the permanent impact, i.e., simultaneous offsetting trades annihilate. The future cost incurred directly as a result of this permanent shift in price by a subsequent order x n+1 submitted in the next period n+1 is x n+1 g i,n (δ 1 x i,n ).
As i's mid-price changes from m i,n → m i,n+1 , so do the steady states of bid and ask sides, going
. This observation adds to the standard one-sided models. The underlying assumption is that agents can update their beliefs about both supply and demand, even if the original trade is unidirectional. The intuition is simple: All market participants, regardless of their intent to buy or sell the asset, can learn by observing trades and therefore prices in the market.
This initiates the recovery phase, at time n + 1 (see Fig. 2(d) ), where we assume that supply is replenished as new agents arrive and place limit orders to refill the order books. Unlike the second phase which is assumed to be implemented immediately before the next trading period, recovery is spread over time, and the order book might remain in disequilibrium potentially over an extended period of time. In the absence of any new market orders, the incoming limit orders will gradually push the best bid/ask prices towards their new equilibrium steady states. The rate at which this happens depends on the inherent properties of the asset and the behavior of market participants. To keep track 13 The linearity assumption is necessary to guarantee that the model does not admit arbitrage and price manipulation strategies as shown inHuberman & Stanzl (2004) . Furthermore, Alfonsi, Schied & Slynko (2012) show that price impact must decay as a convex decreasing function of time to exclude further market irregularities and price manipulation strategies.
of this process we define the functions
,n whose explicit forms are derived in the next sections.
The key takeaway is that by observing the shape q a (p) and q b (p) at time n, one can exactly determine the immediate price impact that submitting a market order at that precise time would have.
We emphasize that this is not a modeling assumption but rather a feature of limit order markets.
Two Assets.
Adding a second asset to the problem introduces several novel features. In particular, we need to take into account the correlation between the stochastic processes driving the mid-prices but also the cross-impact that a trade in one asset can have on the supply/demand curves of the other. These two features are distinct. Correlation is exogenous whereas cross-impact is a direct result of the manager's action. While the former is straightforward, we provide an example of the latter in Figure 3 . Consider a portfolio composed of two assets, and an incoming order to buy x + 1,n shares in the first asset -the second being "inactive". Let λ 21 > 0 be the cross-impact parameter of asset 1 on asset 2. We illustrate how the buy order affects the mid-price of the inactive asset via the term λ 21 x + 1,n (see Fig. 3 (b 2 )). Given the resulting price change, the portfolio value could be significantly affected. Furthermore, the cross-impact will have a secondary effect on the supply/demand curves of the inactive asset. As is shown in Figure 3 (c 2 ), the change in the second asset's mid-price defines a new steady state, initiating a response in the bid/ask books. Specifically, new buy orders arrive to replenish demand while existing ask orders are canceled as prices converge towards the new steady states. Thus, if any subsequent orders are submitted these would be executed at prices which could diverge from the initial state. This effect is further exacerbated as the number of assets in the portfolio increases, since a trade in one could affect the prices of all others. A numerical study is provided in Section 4.
General Multivariate Model.
Once the two-asset problem is understood, the generalization to the M -asset case is straightforward.
Consider a combined portfolio order x ;n = {x + ;n , x − ;n } arriving at time n. The order has an immediate TPI on asset i's best available bid/ask prices, which only depends on the units x ± i;n executed in asset i. On the other hand, the PPI needs to be restated in terms of self-impact and cross-impact terms.
Assumption 4 (Permanent Price Impact) A combined portfolio order x ;n of buys and sells at time n will have a net PPI on asset i s mid-price composed of self-and cross-impact effects:
We also make the following secondary assumptions which simplify the problem further: The self-and cross-impact parameters are symmetric with respect to buy and sell orders, i.e., if x + i,n = x − i,n , then the resulting PPI is effectively zero (in reality this does not necessarily have to be the case).
Assumption 5 (Order Book Resilience) Following an executed order, demand and supply are replenished exponentially with constant decay parameters ρ a i and ρ b i , for the ask and bid sides respectively.
The replenishment dynamics of the best bid/ask-prices between two trading times are thus governed
where δ * a i,n−1 = a * i,n−1 − a ∞ i,n and δ * b i,n−1 = b ∞ i,n − b * i,n−1 are the temporary displacements created in i's bid/ask order books, immediately after an executed order. Following this assumption, the amount of new limit orders, b i,τ and a i,τ , arriving between two trading periods, are given by
Optimal Execution Problem
Having detailed the liquidity model in Section 2, the next step is to derive the expressions for the best prevailing bid/ask prices and the manager's execution costs, as a function of his trading strategy.
Problem Formulation
Lemma 2 (Bid/Ask-Price Processes) Following Assumptions 1-5 and Lemma 1, the best prevailing bid/ask prices available in the order books at time n, are given by
where m ;0 are the initial mid-prices, s ;n is the bid-ask spread, Λ = [λ ij ] M ×M is the matrix of PPI factors and z ;n and d ;n are state vectors which keep track of the order book dynamics as function of the manager's previous orders submitted up to time n.
The vector z ;n was defined in Section 2.2 as the amount of shares left to be purchased at time n.
Recursively, z ;n = z ;n−1 − ∆ M x ;n−1 . The vectors d a ;n and d b ;n keep track of the replenishment process for the ask-and bid-side. Focusing first on the ask side, d a ;n is recursively written as
where κ a = Q a ∆ M + − Λ∆ M is a displacement matrix keeping track of the difference between temporary and permanent impacts, Q a = diag(
) is a temporary price impact matrix, ∆ M + is a matrix operator defined by ∆ M + x ;n−1 = x + ;n−1 , and e −ρ a τ = diag(e −ρ a 1 τ , . . . , e −ρ a M τ ) is the order book replenishment term. Similarly, for the bid side we have d b
;n = (d b ;n−1 + κ b x ;n−1 )e −ρ b τ and we define the aggregate vector as
. These equations describe the evolution of the asset prices as a function of the manager's order history and the order book characteristics. Using these expressions, we can calculate the costs and revenues resulting from an order x ;n submitted at time n.
Lemma 3 (Costs/Revenues) An incoming order to execute x ;n shares at time n will have associated costs (C n ) and revenues (R n ), given by
Let r n be the manager's reward function at n which can be written as the difference between his revenues (from his selling orders) and his costs (from his purchasing orders). It follows that
Assuming a utility function U over his terminal wealth W N = N n=0 r n , his optimization problem can be written as
To capture the trade-off between liquidity and risk, we will assume an exponential utility function over the manager's terminal wealth, with risk-aversion parameter η. Our choice is motivated by several factors: First, it allows us to focus exclusively on the utility derived from execution efficiency, irrespective of the manager's initial wealth -a well-known property of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions. Second, we will show that in our framework, the exponential objective is in fact equivalent to a mean-variance objective -a common modeling choice in the existing portfolio management and price impact literature. Lastly, we will also show that this form leads to a highly tractable optimization problem, which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time. It follows that the manager's problem can be written as
(16) One of the difficulties associated with the problem (16) is that the optimal policy x * is not necessarily deterministic. This can significantly complicate the problem, leading to issues of computational intractability and time inconsistency. In particular, the optimal policy [x * ;n , . . . , x * ;N ] calculated at an arbitrary time n > 0, based on the information set F n , may diverge from the equivalent truncated optimal policy calculated at n = 0 based on the information set at F 0 . In other words, time inconsistency would arise if x * ;n were path-dependent with respect to its adapted filtration F n . It this case, it would be desirable that the manager be allowed to adapt his trading strategy over time, in response to the realizations of the random price process. Implementing this feature requires reformulating the problem (16) recursively, taking into account the information set at each time step.
In general, establishing time consistency for optimal liquidation problems depends on the price impact model and the type of stochasticity that is assumed. The literature has dealt with this issue in various ways, such as developing explicit time-consistent models, or arguing that the manager has to pre-commit to a static strategy at time zero. Bertsimas et al. (1999) In our framework, we show that a static solution is optimal without having to exogenously enforce pre-commitment -a result which is sensitive to the random walk assumption, but which also significantly simplifies the problem. Alfonsi et al. (2008) To show this static property of the solution, we proceed in two steps. First, we formulate the manager's problem as a dynamic program (DP) with inequality constraints, assuming that he can adapt his trading strategy to the information set at each time step. Let J n (·) be the value function at time n, starting with
In the Appendix C, we show that the manager's DP can be formulated as
and that three state variables suffice to describe the system at each period n − 1. These are: 1) the remaining shares to be traded: z ;n−1 , 2) the order book state: d ;n−1 , and 3) the previous period's cumulative wealth: W n−2 . The boundary conditions are z ;0 (specified by the user), d ;0 = 0 and
Here, E n−1 denotes the conditional expectation given F n−1 .
Second, we show that the optimal policy we obtain through the problem (18) is path independent, which establishes time consistency and equivalence between problems (16) and (18) and allows us to reformulate the original optimization problem as a static QP. We provide a proof of this result in Appendix C, and formalize this claim in Proposition 1.
Equivalent Quadratic Program
Proposition 1 (Path-Independence) The optimal policy x * which solves the problem (18) is pathindependent with respect to F n . The vector x * is a deterministic function of the three state variables of the problem, z, d and W , defined in Section 3.1.
The optimal strategy being deterministic, the manager would have no incentive to deviate from it at any future arbitrary time. The problems (16) and (18) are therefore equivalent. While we show in the proof that this result is sensitive to the random walk assumption, the subsequent solution methodology we develop can also handle cases where predictability is added, in the form of a deterministic drift.
Although this would be an interesting extension, we leave this for future work, and instead, focus on the multivariate nature of the problem. 14 Proposition 1 allows us to reformulate the problem (18) as a static QP. To this end, we first introduce an equivalent static form for the stochastic wealth function by reformulating the recursive equations in Section 3.1.
Lemma 4 ( Equivalent Formulation of Wealth) The manager's total stochastic wealth W N = N 0 r n , can be formulated as a quadratic function of the controls given by
The stochastic linear terms arec = [c a , −c b ], with
The 2D × 2D matrix P can be written in terms of lower dimensional square matrices as follows:
The matrices P a and P b represent the impact terms from executing orders independently against the ask and respectively bid sides, while P ab and P ba account for cross-impacts between the two sides.
These can further be expressed in terms of (N + 1) × (N + 1) building-block matrices containing the order book parameters. The explicit forms are given in the Appendix A.
From Proposition 1 we can treat the optimal controls as deterministic variables. It follows that the only source of stochasticity in the problem is the random walk, implying that the manager's terminal wealth is normally distributed. More specifically, using the expressions from Lemma 4, we have that
, where
where Σ w is the covariance matrix of w across time and assets (see Appendix A for explicit forms 
Using this equivalent form and the equations (20) and (21), we can finally reformulate the optimization problem as a standard QP.
Proposition 2 (Quadratic Program) The original dynamic maximization problem (18) is equivalent to the following static quadratic program:
Discussion
The static formulation has several advantages. While the required inequality constraints will restrict the availability of general closed-form solutions, the QP can efficiently handle these types of constraints numerically. Specifically, in the case whereP is positive-definite, the problem is convex and is thus solvable in polynomial time. 15 The formulation can also be extended to include additional deterministic 15 Details regarding the availability of closed-form solutions and convexity bounds can be provided upon request.
linear or quadratic constraints one may want to impose on the set of feasible strategies. This feature is of consequence to practitioners. For instance, in many large-scale portfolio execution programs, managers may want to exercise particular control over certain assets. We provide an example in Section 4.4.2.
Another advantage is that the formulation can be extended to handle time-dependent parameters (relaxing the constraints imposed in Assumptions 1 − 5). Time-dependence can be critical in many situations, for instance, when markets are in turmoil and liquidity shocks are expected to occur in the future (see Brown et al. (2010) for a detailed treatment with uncertain shocks). In our framework, expected liquidity shocks during the execution window could be integrated into the model by adjusting the values of the density q, the replenishment rate ρ and the bid-ask spread s, at the desired periods.
The same could be done to included expected intra-day fluctuations in volume of trade (thus accounting for the well-known intra-day "smile" effect). Details are provided in Appendix B.2.
Case Studies
This section presents several case studies which illustrate our main results. We highlight cases where advanced execution strategies are optimal. These strategies constructively utilize order book crosselasticities to improve execution efficiency. We also quantify the cost savings that can be achieved over more traditional (myopic) optimal policies.
In what follows, we set the bid-ask spread to zero to simplify the exposition. Unsurprisingly, increasing the bid-ask spread leads to higher execution costs and reduces the applicability of advanced trading strategies. A detailed analysis of the effects of the bid-ask spread is provided in the Appendix B.1. Furthermore, to keep the exposition clear, we focus on cases where the manager is seeking to acquire assets in the portfolio. The liquidation case is fully equivalent (by interchanging "buy" and "sell" labels). The model can also treat mixed objective cases without any modifications.
Base Case
We start by examining a base case optimal execution policy (OEP), which will serve as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis. We consider a risk-neutral manager (η = 0) needing to acquire a single asset of 100, 000 units by time N . The OEP z 1,n obtained is plotted in Figure 4 (a) (gray line). The optimal strategy is to conduct two large acquisitions at times 0 and N , and in between, split the rest of the order evenly across time. It is useful to provide some intuition. First, the slope of this curve represents the manager's trading rate. The steeper the slope, the faster he is executing shares. The slope is related to the order book replenishment process. The faster the order book inventory gets replenished after each executed order, the more buy orders the manager can submit per unit time.
Second, the liquidity spikes on the boundaries are related to both the replenishment and boundary conditions of the order book. Since we assume we start in a equilibrium state, it is natural that the first order should be large. In essence, we are getting "cheaper" liquidity at the start. Similarly, the last order should also be large because the assumption is that we are not concerned with the dynamics of the order book after time N. These spikes fade as the inventory recovery rate increases and disappear at the limit when liquidity is infinite and inventories are instantaneously replenished, ρ → ∞ (we do not plot this).
Effect of Correlation
To highlight the implications of the multivariate model, we start with a portfolio of two assets. The first is assumed "active", with boundary conditions that are = 0, while the second is "inactive" (boundary conditions = 0). Under myopic strategies, the second asset should not be traded.
Consider a manager facing the following acquisition scenario: Starting from a portfolio composed of 0 units in each asset, the target is to acquire 100, 000 units in asset 1 by time N . We assume there is no predefined objective in asset 2. Here, we set cross-impact terms to zero and focus instead on the role of correlation. We break down the analysis into the three cases shown in Figure 4 .
In Figure 4 (a), we focus on the role of risk aversion, η. We first note that in the absence of correlation, it is never optimal to trade in the inactive asset. This is expected. The second key insight is that the OEPs are very sensitive to risk aversion. In particular, as risk aversion increases, it is optimal to source greater liquidity early on in the liquidation process. To understand this result, it is helpful to consider extreme values of η. When η → ∞, the manager is only sensitive to the variance of his costs and the solution is trivial: Execute everything at time zero. This of course comes at the expense of increased costs, as the manager is not utilizing the fact that order book inventory replenishes over time. As we decrease η, the sensitivity to liquidity costs increases, prompting the manager to trade less at the beginning.
In Figure 4 (b) we consider the case of high correlation between the two assets. If the manager is risk neutral, there are no trades in the inactive asset. Indeed, any trading in the second asset will simply increase overall costs. However, adding risk aversion (η = 0.1) leads to a complex strategy in the inactive asset. In particular, it becomes optimal to buy the inactive asset at time zero, hold the position and start selling back at variable rates towards the end of the execution window to satisfy the boundary conditions.
It is interesting to note that despite the assumed positive correlation, the optimal policy at time zero involves taking long positions in both assets simultaneously. This may seem counterintuitive given that positive correlation is generally associated with offsetting trades (long and short) in the classical portfolio composition framework. However, in our dynamic framework, going long in both assets provides an effective hedge against future volatility. To understand why, consider the following scenario: Let us assume the price of the active asset increases in the future, implying that subsequent buy orders are more expensive for the manager. In this case, his positively correlated long position in the inactive asset will also accrue in value, thus compensating him for the increased costs he has to
bare. An analogous argument holds for the opposite case of a price decrease.
Lastly, in Figure 4 (c) we assume a fixed risk-aversion coefficient and compare OEPs for portfolios with positive vs. negative correlation. As could be expected, the optimal policy in the inactive asset is symmetric with respect to the horizontal axis. Abstracting away from particularities on shorting/borrowing costs, this implies that managers could take advantage of either positive or negative correlations between assets, as long as correlations are high in absolute terms. Next, we characterize the expected cost savings that can be realized via these strategies, and compare to naive sub-optimal policies. We consider three cases: myopic, semi-myopic and optimal.
Case 1: The myopic type does not consider his own market impact and thus acquires all shares in one order at time 0. The associated acquisition costs are simply C = (m 1,0 + z 1,0 /(2q a 1 ))z 1,0 , and under the assumed parameters in Figure 4 , they amount to 10% of the original portfolio value.
Case 2: The semi-myopic type is aware of his own market impact, but fails to take into account correlations between assets. The cost he incurs by omitting possible correlations is reported in Table   1 , and ranges from 0 bps in the risk-neutral case, to 122 bps in the case with highest risk aversion.
Case 3: Next, we consider a manager who trades optimally taking correlations and market impact into account. The associated utility gains over the other two cases are shown in Table 1 , while the units traded in the inactive asset for the optimal case are reported in Table 2 (the other cases do not utilize the inactive asset in any way).
Effect of Cross-Impact
Here, we remain with the acquisition scenario previously adopted, but set correlations to zero in an attempt to better understand the role of cross-impact. In contrast to correlations which are assumed exogenous, cross-impact accounts for the impact an order in one asset has on the price and supply/demand dynamics of the other. Moreover, this impact does not need to be symmetric: An order in stock A may impact stock B in one way, while changing the order and trading in stock B first, may impact stock A differently. In practice, there are many types of asymmetries that could arise between assets. In some instances, these asymmetries can lead to ephemeral statistical arbitrage opportunities that are typically exploited by high-frequency players. One interesting case worth mentioning is when price impact is antisymmetric, i.e., when purchasing units of asset A increases the price of asset B, while purchasing units of asset B decreases the price of asset A. We study this case below. = 5, 000, ρ1 = ρ2 = 2.5, γ = 0, σ11 = σ22 = 0.05, s = 0, m1,0 = m2,0 = 100, λii = 0. In (a) we show the OEP with no PPI for a risk-neutral manager. In (b) we introduce symmetric cross-impact between both assets and risk aversion. In (c) we show the effects of asymmetric PPI even when the manager is risk-neutral.
No cross-impact: Figure 5 (a) represents the base case without risk aversion and cross-impact. As expected, no trades are executed in the inactive asset and the resulting costs total 4.4%.
Sym. RN Sym. RA Asym. RN Disutility (% of MV) 4.4% 5.68% 4.05% Shares Over-Traded at n = 0 -5% 12% Symmetric cross-impact: Introducing symmetric cross-impact without risk aversion also does not initiate any trades in the inactive asset and the costs over the base case remain unchanged (reported in Table 3 ). On the other hand, in Figure 5 (b), we see that adding risk aversion leads to a 5% purchase in the inactive asset at time 0, and a subsequent sale of the same amount by time N to end flat. Therefore, if risk aversion is considered, symmetric cross-impact and correlation can have similar implications for the manager's OEP, in terms of reducing overall disutility.
Asymmetric cross-impact: However in Figure 5 (c) we also present a case that clearly differentiates between the two effects. We consider antisymmetric cross-impact between two assets and show that even a risk-neutral manager could be better off by trading holistically in both the active and the inactive asset. Indeed, trading holistically saves him around 0.35% in actual costs (see Table 3 ). This is in stark contrast to the previous example of correlations which become irrelevant for a riskneutral manager. Note, that these strategies could be be considered as quasi-arbitrage strategies, 16 however the gains achievable under these scenarios are limited when frictions (such as the bid-ask spread) are considered in our model. Furthermore, every executed order has both a permanent and temporary impact component, and while antisymmetric cross-impact can understandably reduce costs on the permanent component, the manager is also consistently losing some money from the temporary component during trade (i.e., he is "walking" up or down the supply curves getting executed at increasingly costly price levels). This trade-off between temporary and permanent price impacts is fully internalized in the OEP.
Risk vs. Liquidity
Here, we focus on the trade-offs between risk and liquidity by considering a portfolio to be composed of 2 assets with drastically different liquidity characteristics. We assume that the manager starts with zero exposure and has a simple unidirectional objective which is to acquire both assets in equal amounts by the end of the horizon. Figure 6 shows the OEPs we obtain. The liquid asset if represented by the dashed line, and the illiquid one by the solid line. We show the OEP for varying correlation assumptions (by line) and varying risk-aversion assumptions (by column). We find that while the illiquid asset is executed in a binary way (regardless of the parameters) the liquid asset is very sensitive to variations. In general liquid assets will be executed more smoothly, spread throughout the horizon, while illiquid assets converge to corner solutions (i.e., execute half immediately and half at the last period). The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows: Illiquid assets have order books with low replenishment rates leading to asset prices with low mean-reversion. This lack of replenishment implies that one cannot take advantage of inventory dynamics in any meaningful way and thus the optimal solutions tend to be simple (execute half now and half at the end). On the other hand, liquid assets with high replenishment have more interesting dynamics that can be utilized towards the execution problem, leading to richer optimal strategies.
In situations where portfolios are composed of both types of assets, and when these assets are correlated, we can see the emergence of further advanced strategies. In particular, in some cases with significant risk aversion (Figure 6 (h) and Figure 6 (i)), we obtain two-sided trading strategies, despite the simple unidirectional objective. The amount of shares left to be executed in the liquid asset becomes negative for a good portion of the period, indicating overshooting (highlighted in red). More of the liquid asset has been purchased than required. The difference is then recovered by selling back the excess amount in order to meet the boundary conditions as the horizon approaches. 
Synchronization Risk
Given the differences in optimal execution speed across assets of varying liquidity, the manager could be left over-or under-exposed to individual assets during the execution process, i.e., he could be facing transient synchronization risk. To highlight this more clearly, we plot the weight (expressed as a % of holdings) of the illiquid asset in the portfolio over time in Figure 7 , for the same cases that were presented in Figure 6 .
By assumption, the initial weight of each asset is 0 with an optimal target of 50% by the end of the horizon. In Figure 7 (b) we show our base case where both assets are not correlated. We can see that the weight of the illiquid asset varies significantly during the execution process depending on the risk aversion. For low risk aversion (η = 0.1), the manager is overly long the illiquid asset for more than half of the trading horizon. As risk aversion increases (η → ∞), the opposite is true. Figure 7 (a) and Figure 7 (c) show similar plots for the cases where correlation is assumed to exist between both assets. Furthermore, we also observe that for a fixed correlation assumption, increasing risk aversion reduces the variability of the asset weight around the desired 50% line. However, the variability is still significant, especially since in many cases the weight overshoots the mid-line only to recover towards the end. The only case where risk aversion ensures zero weight volatility (and thus minimal exposure to synchronization risk) is for the asymptotic case where η → ∞, which is expected.
The Cost of Diversification
The preceding examples underscore the importance of properly accounting for synchronization risk during large-scale portfolio execution programs. In our framework, this risk can be mitigated by controlling the weights of the assets at each period, and hence their execution speed. This comes down to adding constraints on the admissible order quantities at each period, thus reducing the feasible set of strategies to those that exhibit diversification benefits. By so-doing, one is moving away from the unconstrained global optimum, thus incurring additional costs. This in turn raises the question of what impact this trade-off will have on the bottom line. We define the "cost of diversification" (COD) as a risk-management tool which trades off efficiency in execution costs with diversification risk. Specifically, it represents the cost one would have to incur over the most efficient (lowest cost) outcome, in order to maintain a required diversification profile during the execution process. Formally, the constraints to be added to the optimization problem (23) can be written as follows. At each time n,
where ω * i,n is the optimal target weight of asset i (for example its weight in the targeted well-diversified portfolio) and ξ i,n ∈ [0, ∞] controls the desired margin of error on the bounds for each asset. These constraints guarantee that the weights will remain within ±ξ i,n around the optimal target, for any given period n. The parameter ξ i,n is chosen by the manager and can be thought of as the degree of tolerance to weight variability. The COD is then defined as
where V (x * (ξ)) are the risk-adjusted execution costs (value function of the optimization problem) evaluated at the optimal policy x * (ξ), given the vector ξ of margins. A numerical example follows.
We consider the case of a risk-neutral manager who wishes to attain a certain diversification target (parametrized by ξ i,n = ξ). As in Section 4.4, the portfolio is composed of one liquid and one illiquid asset. We assume the optimal weight distribution to be ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5. In the base case (ξ → ∞), the manager is not concerned about diversification risk and therefore trades each asset myopically given his risk-neutral profile. The resulting OEPs plotted in Figure 8 (a) and Figure 9 (a), indicate that at the beginning of the execution phase the manager is overly long the illiquid asset (compared to the optimal weights) and towards the end he is overly short. In Figure 8 (b), diversification constraints are added to the execution problem with a margin of ξ = 0.1 for both assets. It is interesting to note that, as a result of this requirement, the new OEPs are convex combinations 17 of the myopic strategies.
The corresponding weight profile of the illiquid asset during the execution phase is plotted in Figure   9 (b) and closely follows the optimal weight profile (horizontal 0.5 line). We also show that both OEPs converge to a single strategy at the limit ξ → 0, and this strategy is again a weighted combination of the two extremes (see Fig. 8 (c) and 9(c)). = 5, 000, ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 10, η = 0, σ11 = σ22 = 0.05, s = 0. In (a) we show the weight of the illiquid asset in the portfolio during the execution phase. In (b), the diversification constraints push the weight of the asset closer to the 0.5 line. In (c) at the limit ξ → 0, the portfolio maintains its exact diversification profile.
Cost of Diversification: For a realistic scenario where the manager can tolerate some variance 17 In other words, any curve obtained in the constrained problem can be expressed as a weighted combination of the curves from the unconstrained problem.
around the optimal portfolio weights (ξ = 0.1), we find the COD to be 28bps, while in the worst-case scenario where the manager cannot tolerate any margin of error (ξ → 0), the COD is 45 bps. This effectively represents the upper bound of his cost of diversification, i.e., the maximum amount he would have to pay in excess of the most efficient outcome, in order to remain fully in line with the optimal asset allocation target, while maintaining efficient execution.
Conclusion
Controlling price impact is of central importance in portfolio management, and is particularly crucial in many practical situations where managers need to execute large positions in multiple assets. We have studied the multivariate problem demonstrating that it is far from being a simple extension to the single-asset case. Assets can interact in complex ways and these interactions can have a substantial impact on the optimal execution policies and aggregate portfolio costs. Understanding the exact nature of these interactions requires an extensive market microstructure model that can adequately capture both supply and demand dynamics at the order book level.
Our results suggest that managing execution at the portfolio level requires a holistic approach, i.e., managers should be engaging in a series of non-trivial buy and sell trades in multiple assets simultaneously. The strategies are non-trivial in the sense that they may require one to take long positions in positively correlated assets, or even temporarily overshoot one's portfolio target during the execution window. Furthermore, when extending our analysis to portfolios with heterogeneous liquidity, we find that liquid vs. illiquid assets should be handled very differently. One insight we obtain is that the differential can lead managers exposed to transient synchronization risk. This risk can be mitigated by introducing dynamic portfolio constraints that can preserve diversification benefits at the cost of reduced execution efficiency. This led us to introduce the concept of the "cost of diversification", a measure which allows managers to trade off these two factors, based on their individual preferences.
Perhaps an even more compelling takeaway is that these advanced strategies can become optimal for simple and common execution objectives (such as the liquidation of a single asset in the portfolio). This implies that it may be crucial for managers to systematically take into account cross-asset interactions in their risk-management and trading decisions. It also implies that market regulators should be aware of the increased liquidity needs this can lead to, if deployed on a large-scale basis.
A Explicit Matrix Forms
The components of the matrix P are given by
Building blocks: The self-impact matrices on the diagonals are given by
The cross-asset impact matrices take the form
where • is the Hadamard product. The cross terms between bid and ask sides take the form
The building-block matrices are given by
The combined forms of the self-and cross-impact elementary matrices are
The covariance matrix Σ w is composed of building-block matrices [Σ ij ] N +1×N +1 defined as
where σ ij = γ ij σ i σ j and γ ij is the correlation between the mid-prices of asset pairs i and j. Figure 10 highlights the sensitivity of the OEP to the bid-ask spread (BAS). The OEP is plotted with values of the BAS from bottom to top of 0, 1, 10 and 20 bps. We can see that even with relatively low risk aversion (η = 0.0025), the manager is quite sensitive to the BAS in the inactive asset. At a spread of 20 bps, any trading activity in the inactive asset is halted completely. The associated costs are provided in Table 4 . Disutility (% of MV) 4.52% 4.53% 4.58% 4.63% Units Traded in Inactive Asset (% of Active Shares) 3.6% 3.3% 1.3% - In Figure 11 (a), a liquidity shock at N/2 reduces the depth of orders available. In Figure 11 (b),
B Additional Results

B.1 Bid-Ask Transaction Costs
we study the effect of a liquidity boost. The key takeaway is that the entire OEP changes in the presence of liquidity shocks. There is a significant change of trading velocity both pre-and post-shock.
Furthermore, we see the emergence of temporary "dead-zones" around the time of the shocks where it becomes optimal to halt all trading activity. Intuitively, these indicate that the manager should wait until the shocks are fully absorbed by the order books and supply/demand converges to the new regime before finishing off the remaining orders.
18 A similar analysis is available on the order book densities upon request.
C Proofs
Proof Lemma 1 (Temporary Price Impact)
A buy order of size x being executed against i's ask-side inventory q a i , displaces the best ask price from a i,n → a * i,n , according to:
a i,n q a (p)dp = x.
Combining this expression with Assumption 1, we have
and the temporary price impact function is defined
. Similarly, for a sell order of size x, we have
Proof Equation 8 (New Incoming Orders)
From the exponential recovery Assumption 5 and the equations (6) and (7), we have
Therefore between time n − 1 and time n, the amount of new incoming ask-side orders is given by
where δ * a i,n−1 = a * i,n−1 − a ∞ i,n . Similarly for the bid-side we have
Proof Lemma 2 (Best Prevailing Bid/Ask/Mid Prices)
We present below the derivation for the best ask price dynamics; the bid price dynamics are derived in a similar fashion. Immediately following an executed order at time n−1, the temporary price impact f a i,n−1 will move i's best ask price to
The executed order also has a net permanent price impact g i,n−1 on i's mid-price, the new steady-state ask price at time n is given by
where by definition of the steady state bid-ask spread, we also have a ∞ i,n = m i,n + s i /2. The net displacement resulting from the TPI and PPI on i at time n is given by
where
. Lastly, the difference between i's prevailing best ask price and its steady state at any time n is defined as
Using equations (24), (25) and (26), we have
From equation (27) we have a i,n−1 − a ∞ i,n−1 = d a i,n−1 . Combining this with the above expression, we obtain
Therefore a i,n can be written as
Using the previous recursive equations, we can rewrite d a i,n and a i,n in terms of their parameters at time 0, assuming all the books are originally at equilibrium, i.e., d a i,0 = 0, ∀i ∈ I M , we obtain
Next, replacing h a i,k−1 by its explicit form in equation (26), we have
We proceed to calculate the best prevailing ask price at a general time n. From equation (27),
, where the mid-price at time n right before the next incoming order arrives is
Therefore we can write
Finally, combining this with the form in equation (29), and extending the analysis to the bid side, we have
Moreover, i's mid-price is m i,n = m i,0 + w i,n + n k=1 j∈I M λ ij δx j,k−1 . We can see that the price processes are linear in the control variables.
Next, we proceed to rewrite these expressions in vector form utilizing the recursive properties. The state vectors z and d introduced in the text follow naturally by looking at the terms in the two previous equations (30) and (31). Letting z ;n be the state vector of net shares remaining to be purchased right before the next order arrives at time n, we have by definition
Recursively, we can write z ;n = z ;n−1 − ∆ M x ;n−1 . Using this recursive form, the PPI term in the price process equations (30) and (31) can be written as
where [·] i is an operator which returns the i-th line of a matrix and Λ is the matrix of PPI factors.
The second state vector keeps track of the recovery process for each order book side. For the limit asks we can show that the recursive equation for asset i is given by
After some further algebra we can write the vector form as
Similarly for the bid side we have d b ;n = (d b ;n−1 + κ b x ;n−1 )e −ρ b τ . Combining the above results, and identifying the terms in equations (30) and (31), we have the final vector forms for the best prevailing ask and bid prices a ;n = m ;0 + w ;n + s ;n + Λ(
Proof Lemma 3 (Execution Costs/Revenues) Following an executed order, the associated costs/revenues can simply be calculated by integrating the best prevailing ask/bid prices over the total amount of units executed x. It follows that
where a * i,n (x) and b * i,n (x) are given in equations (30) and (31). Therefore we have
Specifically, for an incoming order
The vector forms across all assets at time n can then be expressed as
Proof Proposition 1 (Path Independence)
We first prove that the path-independence property holds for a simplified unconstrained version of the problem. From there, it becomes clear that this result can be extended to the original constrained problem. Key to the proof will be a separability property of the wealth and value functions at each period, which can be separated into a linear stochastic term and a deterministic function of the controls and state variables. The reward associated with the manager's buy and sell orders at n is
where we introduce the following notation:
Isolating the terms which depend explicitly on the noise term w ;n , the reward can be written as
where the function θ n = θ n (z n , d n , x n ) is by construction, a deterministic function linear in the state vectors, and quadratic in the controls at n. Formally, θ n represents the manager's execution costs for an order at time n, net of the exogenous stochastic parameters of the problem:
θ n = x ;n p ;n − x ;n Qx ;n + x ;n ∆ M w ;n . The manager's cumulative wealth at an arbitrary time n is W n = n j=0 r j . Recursively, we have
The manager's optimization problem over his terminal wealth is
where J 0 (·) denotes the value function at 0. We can gain some useful insights into the properties of the value function and optimal control by looking at the first two iterations, starting at N.
Analysis at the boundary
By definition, at the final time step, the optimal policy is equal to the state vector of remaining trades, i.e., x * ;N ∆ M = z ;N . Then, using the Equations (32) and (33), the value function at N is
. Rolling one step back, we show that J N −1 only depends on the known cumulative wealth from the previous period, N − 2, and the state vectors of the problem at N − 1. Given x * ;N , the value function at N − 1 is
From the Equation (33), we have W N = W N −2 + r N −1 + r * N . Then, applying the Equation (32) we obtain J N −1 = max
At this stage, we can remove the dependence on the state at time N by using the recursive state equations: We know that x * ;N ∆ M = z ;N = z ;N −1 − x ;N −1 ∆ M . Similarly, the vector θ * N introduced earlier, can be re-written as
where we introduced φ N −1 , a deterministic function of the state vectors at N − 1 with the same quadratic properties as θ * N . It follows that
Lastly, replacing w ;N by it's recursive form w ;N = w ;N −1 + u ;n , we obtain
At this stage, we highlight several important properties: The expectation is conditional on the adapted filtration F N −1 , implying that the only stochastic term is u ;N , which is normally distributed. Furthermore, the path-dependent term x ;N −1 ∆ M w ;N −1 cancels out during the last operation. This will have important consequences on the structure of the optimal policy at N − 1, as we will show in the first-order conditions. Next, we separate the deterministic and stochastic terms by defining the
To summarize, we have shown that the value function at N − 1 can be written as
where by construction, V is a deterministic function, conditional on F N −1 , andṼ is normally distributed. Given these properties, and using the identity
Var [Ṽ ] for any normal distributed variableṼ , we have
By monotonicity of the exponential, the optimal policy at N − 1 can be obtained by solving the equivalent optimization problem given by x * ;N −1 = arg max
Thus, we can see that at N − 1, optimizing over an exponential utility is equivalent to optimizing over a mean-variance objective.
The next step is to gain some insights into the properties of the optimal control at N − 1. For this,
we will continue working with the mean-variance form. Following the Equations (37) and (38), the mean is simply
while the variance is
We can see that the N − 1 variance only depends on the state vector of remaining trades and the control at N − 1. Combining the mean and variance expressions we have
;N −1 = arg max
The first-order conditions at this stage are given by
Looking at the system of equations obtained from the first-order conditions, it is clear that x * ;N −1 is not path-dependent. Indeed, there is no term which depends explicitely on the realization of the random walk at N −1, w ;N −1 . Furthermore, since θ N −1 and φ N −1 are, by construction, quadratic functions of x ;N −1 and only depend on the state vectors at N − 1, then x * ;N −1 will simply be a function of the two state vectors z ;N −1 and d ;N −1 . We write the general form as
where H ;N −1 is a deterministic function of the state vectors at N − 1 whose exact expression is not relevant for the proof. It follows that plugging this back into J N −1 will yield a value function which takes the form
where we have separated the exponential into a deterministic term:
and a path-dependent term: z ;N −1 w ;N −1 . We proceed to prove by induction that this separability property is conserved for all times, leading to optimal controls that are path-independent.
General proof by induction
Let J n = J n (z ;n , d ;n , W n−1 , n) be the value function at time n. The equivalent dynamic program of problem (18) without inequality constraints, is given by
Assume that the value function and optimal policy at n take the following forms:
where Θ * n = Θ * n (z ;n , d ;n ) = Θ n (z ;n , d ;n , x * ;n ). We need to show that three properties hold. The first is that if the value function has this form at time n, it will lead to an optimal control x * ;n−1 that is path-independent at time n − 1. The second is that at n − 1, J n−1 will conserve this separable form. This would also imply that x * ;n−2 would be path-independent, and so forth. The third and final property is to check that this holds true at the boundary, which we have already confirmed through our previous analysis at times N and N − 1. Next, we look at an arbitrary time n − 1. From the induction assumption (43), we have J * n = −e −η(W n−1 +Θ * n −z ;n w;n) , which after using the equations (3) and (33), can be written as J * n = −e −η(W n−2 +θ n−1 +Θ * n −z ;n−1 w ;n−1 −(z ;n−1 −x ;n−1 ∆ M )u;n) .
Using the recursive state equations we can express Θ * n as a function of the states at n − 1.
Next, we look at the dynamic programming equation (42). We have J n−1 = max
= max x ;n−1 E n−1 −e −η(W n−2 +θ n−1 +Φ n−1 −z ;n−1 w ;n−1 −(z ;n−1 −x ;n−1 ∆ M )u;n)
= max
Var n−1[ W n−2 +θ n−1 +Φ n−1 −z ;n−1 w ;n−1 −(z ;n−1 −x ;n−1 ∆ M )u;n] .
After taking the mean and the variance at n − 1, the optimal policy at this stage can be obtained by solving the equivalent mean-variance optimization problem
;n−1 = arg max
which is quadratic in x ;n−1 as well as in the state vectors at n − 1. The first order condition will yield an optimal policy which is clearly path-independent as the only term which explicitly depends on w ;n−1 is not a function of x ;n−1 . Letting x * ;n−1 = H ;n−1 (z ;n−1 , d ;n−1 ) be the optimal solution at n − 1, we complete the induction proof by setting Θ * n−1 = θ * n−1 + Φ * n−1 − 1 2 η(z ;n−1 − x * ;n−1 ∆ M )τ Σ u (z ;n−1 − ∆ M x * ;n−1 ), which gives the form we need, namely J * n−1 = −e −η(W n−2 +Θ * n−1 −z ;n−1 w ;n−1 ) .
We can thus conclude that the optimal control at the previous time step is path-independent and separability is preserved. In fact, the above induction arguments show that a closed-form solution is available for the case without inequality constraints (although the calculations are cumbersome).
Inequality constrained problem
To complete the proof, we still need to look at the case with inequality constraints on the control variables x ;n ≥ 0. Let ν ;n be the associated positivity multiplier vector at time n. To establish pathindependence for the optimal solution in this case, we need to show that both x * ;n and ν ;n are pathindependent. Without doing any analysis, we know this result needs to hold for the following reason:
We showed that the unconstrained problem is in fact deterministic, therefore adding deterministic constraints to a deterministic problem will not affect the static nature of the optimal policy.
The formal proof for this follows and is similar to the unconstrained problem. We can obtain the necessary insights by looking at the two last periods of the problem. At time N , we have by definition 0 ≤ x * ;N and x * ;N ∆ M = z ;N . Looking at the problem at N − 1, and using the Equation ( 
We can then write an equivalent maximization problem to the Problem (46), by taking the logarithm and plugging in the forms from the Equations (37) and (37). We obtain: 
where, by definition of φ N −1 and θ N −1 , the term ∇ x ;N −1 (φ N −1 + θ N −1 ) is a deterministic linear function of x ;N −1 . This is also clearly the case for the second term η(z ;N −1 − x ;N −1 ∆ M )(τ Σ u ) which only depends on the control and state vectors at N − 1 and the stationary covariance matrix. As there are no stochastic terms in the system of equations, we can conclude that the multipliers at N − 1 (which can be calculated by considering the complementary slackness and dual feasibility conditions for each asset at N − 1) are necessarily deterministic. More specifically, from the Equation (47), we can write the form of the optimal control at N − 1 as From here, we could proceed using the exact same induction arguments that we developed for the unconstrained problem to show that the first-order conditions at each time period lead to deterministic optimal controls and multipliers at all periods. We conclude that ν ;n will preserve this path-independence property for all n.
From a more intuitive perspective, this result states that the generated filtration provides no useful information for the optimal control in our framework. This implies that the manager has nothing to gain by adopting adaptive trading strategies in the CARA framework, with our random walk assumption.
Our path-independence result can be compared to other types of price impact models that have been developed in the literature. In particular, Almgren & Chriss (2000) and Huberman & Stanzl (2005) show that a similar static policy exists in their mean-variance framework. However, it is worth mentioning that this result is not generally robust to the type of noise process assumed in the model.
For example, if we wanted to include serial correlation in our framework, we could show that this would lead to an optimal policy which is path-dependent (i.e., not static). In this case, we would need to augment our state space to include the adapted filtration and develop a numerical solution methodology without being able to rely on static equivalence. In other words, the optimal policy would be "adaptive". Other examples of adaptive optimal liquidation policies can be found in Lorenz & Almgren (2012) .
Proof Lemma 4 (Equivalent Wealth Formulation)
We proceed via verification, starting with the inferred form, and showing that by expansion, we obtain the desired expressions equivalent to (30) and (31). Expanding the wealth process we have
Focusing on the ask side, we can show after some algebra that Furthermore, we also need to include the cross-terms coming from the opposite side of the book: By identification, we recover the complete form of the ask-side price process (the bid-side is derived in a similar way). The form for the costs follows immediately.
Proof Equations (20) and (21) (Expectation and Variance)
Expectation: Following Proposition 1, the optimal control vector x is deterministic. Therefore we can remove it from the operator and take the expectation directly on the linear term in equation (19). After some algebra, the expectation over the stochastic linear term can be expressed as
The expected wealth then becomes 
